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Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of physical layer
secrecy on the performance of a unified non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) framework, where both external and internal
eavesdropping scenarios are examined. The spatial locations
of legitimate users (LUs) and eavesdroppers are modeled by
invoking stochastic geometry. To characterize the security per-
formance, new exact and asymptotic expressions of secrecy
outage probability (SOP) are derived for both code-domain
NOMA (CD-NOMA) and power-domain NOMA (PD-NOMA),
in which imperfect successive interference cancellation (ipSIC)
and perfect SIC (pSIC) are taken into account. For the external
eavesdropping scenario, the secrecy diversity orders by a pair
of LUs (the n-th user and m-th user) for CD/PD-NOMA are
obtained. Analytical results make known that the diversity orders
of the n-th user with ipSIC/pSIC for CD-NOMA and PD-NOMA
are equal to zero/K and zero/one, respectively. The diversity
orders of the m-th user are equal to K/one for CD/PD-NOMA.
For the internal eavesdropping scenario, we examine the analysis
of secrecy diversity order and observe that the m-th user to
wiretap the n-th user with ipSIC/pSIC for CD-NOMA and PD-
NOMA provide the diversity orders of zero/K and zero/one,
respectively, which is consistent with external eavesdropping
scenario. Numerical results are present to confirm the accuracy
of the analytical results developed and show that: i) The secrecy
outage behavior of the n-th user is superior to that of the m-th
user; ii) By increasing the number of subcarriers, CD-NOMA is
capable of achieving a larger secrecy diversity gain compared to
PD-NOMA.
Index terms— A unified framework, non-orthogonal mul-
tiple access, physical layer security, stochastic geometry
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing pervasiveness of smart devices and in-
creasing the demand of mobile data traffic, it is necessary
to explore a solution to spectrum resource shortage. The fifth
generation (5G) mobile communication networks have aroused
a great deal of concern, since it is capable of reflecting a
large diversity of application domains and communication
requirements [2, 3]. Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
has been envisaged as a promising technique of 5G networks
to ensure massive connectivity and achieve higher spectrum
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utilization [4, 5]. The essential thought of NOMA is that a
plurality of users share the same time-frequency resources
over different power allocation with the aid of superposition
coding. At receiver side, successive interference cancellation
(SIC) or message passing algorithm (MPA) are carried out to
extract the desired signals by mitigating multiuser interference
[6, 7]. From the perspective of standard trend, NOMA has been
approved for inclusion in the 3rd generation partnership project
long-term evolution advanced (LTE-A) systems [8, 9], where
NOMA is referred to as downlink multiuser superposition
transmission scheme. Furthermore, layered division multiplex-
ing scheme has been accepted by the next generation digital
TV standard (ATSC 3.0), which is one of non-orthogonal
multiplexing techniques [10].
Many kinds of NOMA schemes have been proposed, which
can be further divided into two major categories, i.e., power-
domain NOMA (PD-NOMA) and code-domain NOMA (CD-
NOMA). Until now, the academic mainly investigate the
system performance of PD-NOMA and its applications. In
[11], the performance of PD-NOMA has been characterized
in terms of outage probability and ergodic rate with spatially
random users. To guarantee the fairness of multiple users, the
proportional fairness scheduling is employed to maximize sum
rate of NOMA system [12]. As a further advance, the authors
in [13] have studied the impact of user pairing on the perfor-
mance of PD-NOMA, where the gap of sum rates between PD-
NOMA and conventional multiple access is determined by the
users’ channel conditions. Applying NOMA into cooperative
communications, the outage behaviors of cooperative PD-
NOMA system have been evaluated experimentally in [14, 15],
where the user with the better channel conditions is viewed as
a decode-and-forward (DF) relay to deliver information. Trig-
gered by this, the authors of [16, 17] have analyzed the outage
performance of NOMA based on an amplify-and-forward (AF)
relaying over Nakagami-m fading scenarios. With the goal of
maximizing energy efficiency, the application of simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer to PD-NOMA has
been discussed extensively in [18]. Apart from the above
studies, recently in [19], the authors have investigated the
impact of PD-NOMA on mobile edge computing, where the
offloading probability and energy consumption of user are
evaluated respectively. To capture the potential performance of
PD-NOMA in the context of wireless caching, the authors in
[20, 21] have proposed a pair of PD-NOMA caching schemes (
i.e., push then delivery and push-and-delivery) and researched
the caching hit probability and delivery outage probability.
Different from PD-NOMA, the main study of the industry
2belongs to CD-NOMA, which can be regarded as an extension
of PD-NOMA. With regard to CD-NOMA, a large number of
users’ information are mapped into multiple resource elements
or subcarriers by the virtue of a sparse spreading matrix. The
remarkable representatives of CD-NOMA consist of sparse
code multiple access [22], pattern division multiple access
[23], multi-user sharing access [24] and resource spread multi-
ple access, etc. From the viewpoint of a unified framework, the
authors in [25] have identified various NOMA schemes, where
the performance comparison of NOMA schemes is presented
form receiver complexity, user overload and peak throughput.
In [26], resource allocation and user association were surveyed
in the unified NOMA framework based on heterogeneous ultra
dense networks. Exploiting the specific characteristics of the
unified NOMA framework, the authors of [27] have analyzed
the outage performance and system throughput of CD/PD-
NOMA, where the unified expressions of both exact and
approximate expressions for connection outage probabilities
are derived in detail.
Together with NOMA, physical layer security (PLS) has
attracted more research attention. The issues of security fea-
tures for 5G networks have taken on an increasingly pivotal
role in the corresponding security services [28, 29]. Explicit
insights for understanding NOMA and PLS, the maximization
of secrecy sum rate for NOMA system was analyzed in [30],
where the power allocation to users is taken into consideration.
In [31], the authors have studied the impact of NOMA with
multicasting transmission on PLS. By applying stochastic
geometry theory, the authors of [32] have investigated the
security outage behavior of single antenna and multiple an-
tenna transmission scenarios for NOMA networks. Condition
on unknown channel state information (CSI), the authors
evaluated the secrecy outage behavior of NOMA system [33],
in which the design of decoding order and power allocation
were formulated. To further enhance the secrecy performance
of NOMA systems, the PLS of multiple-input single-output
NOMA system was studied with the objective of protecting
confidential information of legitimate users (LUs) by em-
ploying artificial noise [34]. Furthermore, the authors in [35]
investigated the secrecy outage behaviors of multiple-input
multiple-output NOMA, where the max-min transmit antenna
selection scheme was proposed carefully. Combining the PLS
and cooperative communication, the secrecy rate of NOMA
systems was analyzed in [36] via introducing a number of
trusted half-duplex relaying, i.e., cooperative jamming, DF and
AF relaying. In the presence of external eavesdroppers (Eves),
the authors of [37] highlighted the security features of AF
based two-way NOMA networks by exploiting subcarriers and
user scheduling. In addition, the authors in [38] investigated
the secrecy outage performance of multiple-relays assisted
NOMA with invoking the relay selection schemes.
A. Motivations and Contributions
While the aforementioned significant treatise has laid a
basic foundation for understanding the applications of NOMA,
the PLS of NOMA for a unified framework is far from
being well understood. In [31], the security enhancement
of multicast-unicast scenario based on NOMA is achieved,
where the internal eavesdropping scenario, i.e., the distant
users are regarded as the Eves to wiretap the information of
nearby users is only discussed. With the emphasis on PLS,
the authors of [32] studied the secrecy performance of PD-
NOMA, where the perfect successive interference cancella-
tion (pSIC) scheme is carried out at LUs and Eves. This
assumption will overestimate users’ detection capability and
result in the performance deviation. In addition, the authors
of [27] evaluated the outage behaviors of CD/PD-NOMA in a
unified framework, but the secure communication scenario of
unified NOMA framework is not surveyed. Motivated by the
aforementioned research contributions, we focus our attentions
on investigating the PLS for a unified NOMA framework,
where both external and internal eavesdropping scenarios
are considered. Relaxing the assumption of pSIC, imperfect
successive interference cancellation (ipSIC) scheme is carried
out to cover the implementation issues. Moreover, the spatial
locations of LUs and Eves are modeled by using stochastic
geometry. The secrecy analyses for a pair of NOMA LUs are
characterized in terms of secrecy outage probability (SOP).
Based on the above explanations, the primary contributions of
this article are summarized as follows:
1) For external eavesdropping scenario, we derive the exact
expressions of SOP for the pairing LUs (i.e., the n-th
user and m-th user) in CD/PD-NOMA networks. We
also derive the asymptotic SOP and obtain the corre-
sponding secrecy diversity orders. We confirm that the
secrecy diversity orders of the n-th user with pSIC for
CD/PD-NOMA are equal to the number of subcarriers,
i.e.,K and one, respectively. Due to the effect of residual
interference, the SOP of the n-th user with ipSIC for
CD/PD-NOMA converges to an error floor in the high
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) region and obtain a zero
secrecy diversity order.
2) We derive both exact and asymptotic expressions of SOP
for the m-th user in CD/PD-NOMA networks. On the
basis of asymptotic analyses, we identify that the secrecy
diversity orders of the m-th user for CD/PD-NOMA are
equal to K and one, respectively. We observe that the
secrecy outage performance of the n-th user with pSIC
is superior to that of the m-th user. We also demonstrate
that the secrecy outage behavior of the n-th user with
pSIC is superior to that of the conventional multiple
access (OMA) scheme, while the secrecy performance
of the m-th user is inferior to OMA.
3) For internal eavesdropping scenario, we derive the exact
expressions of SOP for the m-th user to wiretap the
information of the n-th user in CD/PD-NOMA net-
works. To obtain remarkable insights, we further derive
the asymptotic SOP of this scenario and obtain the
corresponding diversity order. On the condition of ipSIC,
the secrecy diversity orders of the m-th user to wiretap
the information of the n-th user for CD/PD-NOMA are
equal to zero. We confirm that the corresponding SOP
converges to an error floor in the high SNR region.
4) We examine the secrecy diversity order of the m-th user
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Fig. 1: An illustration of a unified secure NOMA transmission
network, where the spatial distributions of LUs and Eves
follow homogeneous poisson point processes (HPPPs).
to wiretap the information of the n-th user with pSIC.
We observe that the secrecy diversity orders for CD/PD-
NOMA networks are equal to K and one, respectively.
We show that the security performance of CD-NOMA is
better than that of PD-NOMA in internal eavesdropping
scenario.
B. Organization and Notation
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the network model and transmission formulation
of secure communications in a unified NOMA framework. In
Section III, the secrecy performance of the unified NOMA
framework are evaluated by using outage probability. Nu-
merical results in Section IV are shown for providing the
available insights and performance evaluation. Finally, Section
V summarizes this paper. The mathematical derivation proofs
are collected in the appendix.
The main notations of this paper are shown as follows.
FX (·) and fX (·) denote the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of a random
variableX ; The superscripts (·)∗ and (·)T stand for conjugate-
transpose operation and transpose, respectively; E{·} denotes
the expectation operation; diag (·) represents a diagonal ma-
trix; ‖·‖22 denotes Euclidean two norm of a vector; IK is an
K ×K identity matrix.
II. NETWORK MODEL
A. Network Descriptions
Consider a unified secure NOMA transmission scenario
illustrated in Fig. 1, where a base station (BS) transmits the
information to M LUs in the presence of malicious Eves.
In particular, the BS maps the information of multiple LUs
into K subcarriers or time-frequency resource elements by
utilizing a predefined sparse matrixGK×M 1, where the matrix
dimension satisfies the inequality 1 ≤ K < M . The aim of
1The sparse matrix can be interpreted as the mapping from transmitted data
information to subcarriers, which can be found in [22, 23]. A “1” means that
the data shall be mapped to the corresponding subcarrier, while “0” means
that no data is mapped.
this relationship is to ensure the overload of sparse matrix. If
M is less than or equal to K , it will make sure each user
to enjoy an orthogonal resource element, while in the non-
orthogonal case,M is greater than K . There are a few number
of non-zero entries within GK×M and each non-zero entry
corresponds to a subcarrier. To facilitate analysis, the BS, LUs
and Eves are equipped with single antenna, respectively. As a
further advance, assuming that M LUs are divided into M/2
orthogonal pairs, where the nearby user and distant user are
capable of being distinguished based on their disparate channel
conditions. The BS is located at the center of a disc denoted
as D1, with radius RD1 and M/2 users are distributed within
D1, while the remaining M/2 users are deployed within the
disc denoted as D2, with radius RD2 . The spatial locations
of LUs and Eves are governed by marked HPPPs Φl and Φe
with density λl and λe [39, 40], respectively. A bounded path
loss model is used to model the channel coefficients from
the BS to LUs and Eves, which is to ensure that the path
loss is always larger than one for any distance. The channel
between BS and LUs, and between BS and Eves as are denoted
as main channel and wiretap channel, respectively. Here we
emphasize that the CSI of Eves is not accessible at the BS
while that of LUs is available. A pair of users are randomly
selected to carry out NOMA protocol2. It is worth pointing out
that more sophisticated user pairing is capable of enhancing
the system performance, which will be researched in our
future works. From the perspective of secure transmission
design, we consider both external and internal eavesdropping
scenarios in this treatise. In external eavesdropping scenario,
the Eves individually overhear the communication of main
channel between the BS and LUs, where the n-th user and m-
th user are randomly selected to carry out the NOMA protocol;
In internal eavesdropping scenario, the m-th user who has
the worse channel conditions is viewed as Eve to wiretap
the n-th user. We assume that the nearby users and Eves
are not simultaneously distributed on the same boundary, but
considering the case of the nearby users and Eves appearing on
the same boundary is capable of further enriching the contents,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Signal Model
In unified NOMA transmission scenario, the data streams of
each user, i.e.,M LUs are spread by employing one column of
sparse matrix and then superposed over K subcarriers. Hence
when the BS transmits the superposed signals to LUs, the
observation at the ϕ-th user for the unified NOMA framework
is given by
yϕ=diag (hϕ) (gn
√
Psanxn + gm
√
Psamxm) + nϕ, (1)
where ϕ ∈ (n,m). xn and xm are supposed to be normalized
power signals of the n-th user and m-th user, respectively,
i.e, E{x2n} = E{x2m} = 1. Additionally, we assume that
2The benefit of user pairing is that co-channel interference and system com-
plexity are relatively small, which will lead to the better SOP performance for
PD/CD-NOMA. Since multiple users are admitted at the same time/frequency
and spreading code, co-channel interference and system complexity will be
strong in NOMA systems [13, 41].
4the power allocation coefficients of the n-th user and m-th
user satisfy the conditions am > an and am + an = 1,
which is taken into account for fairness between LUs. The
optimal power allocation coefficients are capable of enhancing
the performance of NOMA networks, which are beyond the
scope of this paper. Ps denotes the BS’s transmission power.
gϕ = [gϕ1gϕ2 · · · gϕK ]T is the mapping indicator vector of the
ϕ-th user which is one column of GK×M . More specifically,
gϕk = 1 and gϕk = 0 indicate whether or not the signals are
mapped into the k-th subcarrier, respectively. For the sake of
clarity, assuming that GK×M belongs to regular sparse matrix
with the same column weight. hϕ = [h˜ϕ1h˜ϕ2 · · · h˜ϕK ]T
denotes the channel vector between the BS and ϕ-th user at
K subcarriers with h˜ϕk =
√
ηhϕk√
1+dαϕ
, where hϕk ∼ CN (0, 1)
is the Rayleigh fading channel between the BS and ϕ-th user
at the k-th subcarrier, η is a frequency dependent factor, α
is the path loss exponent and dϕ is the distance from BS to
the ϕ-th user. nϕ ∼ CN (0, N0IK) denotes the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the ϕ-th user. Note that based on
the setting of the number of subcarriers, the unified NOMA
framework can be categorized to CD-NOMA (K 6= 1) and
PD-NOMA (K = 1), respectively. From the viewpoint of
complexity order, the complex of CD-NOMA is greater than
that of PD-NOMA3.
To maximize the output SNRs, the maximal-ratio combining
(MRC) is carried out [7, 43] at the ϕ-th user over K subcar-
riers. Let uϕ =
(diag(hϕ)gϕ)
∗
‖diag(hϕ)gϕ‖ and the observation at the ϕ-th
user can be rewritten as
y˜ϕ = uϕdiag (hϕ) (gn
√
Psanxn + gm
√
Psamxm) + uϕnϕ.
(2)
Due to having better channel condition, the n-th user will
carry out the SIC scheme, i.e., the n-th user first detect
the information xm and remove this component from the
superposed signal to decode the information xn. Hence the
signal-plus-interference-to-noise ratio (SINR) of the n-th user
to detect its own information is give by
γn =
ρ ‖diag (hn)gn‖22 an
̟ρ ‖hI‖22 + 1
, (3)
where ρ = Ps
N0
denotes the transmit SNR. ̟ ∈ [0, 1]
is the impact level of residual interference. i.e., ̟ 6= 0 and
̟= 0 denote the ipSIC and pSIC operation, respectively.
hI = [hI1hI2 · · ·hIK ]T denotes the residual interference
channel vector with hIk ∼ CN (0,ΩI).
The SINR of the m-th user to decode the information of
itself is given by
γm =
ρ ‖diag (hm)gm‖22 am
ρ ‖diag (hm) gn‖22 an + 1
. (4)
3Since the operation of multiplications is much more complex than that
of additions, many contributions [7, 42] compare the complexity with respect
to the number of multiplications. At this time, the complexity of MPA for
CD-NOMA is on the order of O(dfKM
df ), where M and df denote the
size of modulation constellation and maximum row weight of sparse matrix,
respectively, while the complexity order of SIC is equal to one for PD-NOMA.
1) External Eavesdropping Scenario: Different from [32],
we focus on relaxing the idealistic assumptions that the Eves
are incapable of carrying out the perfect multiuser detection
4. For instance, the Eves only have limited computing power
and allow the interference signal to exist. Similar to (2), the
MRC-combined signal at Eves for the unified framework can
be given by
y˜e = uediag (he) (gn
√
Psanxn + gm
√
Psamxm) + uene,
(5)
where ue =
(diag(he)ge)
∗
‖diag(he)ge‖ . he = [h˜e1h˜e2 · · · h˜eK ]T denotes the
channel vector between the BS and Eves over K subcarriers
with h˜ek =
√
ηhek√
1+dαe
, where hek ∼ CN (0, 1) is Rayleigh fading
channel from the BS to Eves at the k-th subcarrier, and de is
the distance between BS and Eves. ge = [ge1ge2 · · · geK ]T
belongs to one column of GK×M . ne ∼ CN (0, NeIK)
denotes the AWGN at Eves.
Based on the above assumptions, the Eves first detect the
m-th user’s information and regard the n-th user’s information
as interference signal. Then the received SINRs of detecting
the n-th user’s information at the most pernicious Eve can be
given by
γEn = max
e∈Φe
{
ρe ‖diag (he)ge‖22 an
̟ρe ‖hIe‖22 + 1
}
, (6)
where ρe =
Ps
Ne
denote the transmit SNR with variance Ne of
AWGN at Eves and hIe = [hIe1hIe2 · · ·hIeK ]T denotes the
residual interference channel vector with hIek ∼ CN (0,ΩIe).
The SINR of detecting the m-th user’s information at the
most pernicious Eve is given by
γEm = max
e∈Φe
{
am ‖diag (he) ge‖22ρe
an ‖diag (he)ge‖22 ρe + 1
}
. (7)
2) Internal Eavesdropping Scenario: The distant user (i.e.,
the m-th user) is regarded as Eve, who directly wiretap the
nearby user’s (the n-th user) information. At this moment, the
SNR of the m-th user to detect the n-th user can be given by
γEm→n = max
e∈Φe
{
ρe ‖diag (hm)gm‖22 an
}
. (8)
C. Channel Statistical Formulations
In this subsection, we present the channel statistical prop-
erties of main channel, which will be used to evaluate SOP in
the following section.
Lemma 1. Assuming M LUs distributed uniformly within a
disc D1, the CDF F
ipSIC
CD,γn
of the n-th user with ipSIC for
CD-NOMA is given by
F ipSICCD,γn (x) ≈ ∆
U∑
u=1
bu
[
ΩKI Γ (K)− e−
xcu
ηρan
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
φψ
i!
×
(
xcu
ηρan
)i (
ηanΩI
x̟cuΩI + ηan
)K+j]
, (9)
4It is worth mentioning that assuming the Eves have not enough powerful
detection abilities is more in line with the requirements of practical scenarios,
which is also the similar assumption in [41].
5where ∆ = 1
(K−1)!ΩKI
, bu =
π
2U
√
1− θ2u (θu + 1), cu=1 +[
RD1
2 (θu + 1)
]α
, θu = cos
(
2u−1
2U π
)
, φ =
(
i
j
)
= i!(i−j)!j! ,
ψ = (̟ρ)jΓ (K + j), ̟ 6= 0 and U is a parameter to ensure
a complexity-accuracy tradeoff. Γ (·) denotes the Gamma
function [44, Eq. (8.310.1)].
Proof. See Appendix A.
Upon substituting ̟ = 0 into (9), the CDF F pSICCD,γn of the
n-th user with pSIC for CD-NOMA can be given by
F pSICCD,γn (x) ≈
U∑
u=1
bu
[
1− e− xcuηρan
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
xcu
ηρan
)i]
. (10)
For the special case with K = 1, the CDF F ipSICPD,γn of the
n-th user with ipSIC for PD-NOMA is given by
F ipSICPD,γn (x) ≈
U∑
u=1
bu
(
1− ηan
ηan + xcuΩI
e−
xcu
ηρan
)
. (11)
Upon substituting ̟ = 0 into (11), the CDF F ipSICPD,γn of the
n-th user with pSIC for PD-NOMA is given by
F pSICPD,γn (x) ≈
U∑
u=1
bu
(
1− e− xcuηρan
)
. (12)
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we focus attention on the scenario, where
the CSI of the Eves is not available at BS. More precisely,
the BS transmits the information at a fixed secrecy data rate.
Under this condition, if instantaneous secrecy rate is less than
a target secrecy rate, secrecy outage will be happen [45, 46].
Hence the SOP5 can be employed to characterize the security
performance for the unified NOMA framework. Inspired by
this, the security performance of both external and internal
eavesdropping scenarios are characterized in terms of secrecy
outage behaviors. To this end, both exact and asymptotic
expressions of SOP for LUs are provided in detail. Based
on the analytical results, secrecy diversity order of the unified
NOMA network can be obtained in the high SNR region. Note
that more meaningful comparisons (i.e., secrecy ergodic rate
and energy efficiency) between PD-NOMA and CD-NOMA
will further enrich the contents of this paper, which we may
include in our future work.
A. External Eavesdropping Scenario
Considering a two user case, the n-th user and m-th user
are paired together to carry out the NOMA protocol. Define
the secrecy rate achieved of the n-th user and m-th user for
the unified NOMA framework as
Cn = [log2 (1 + γn)− log2 (1 + γEn)]+, (13)
and
Cm = [log2 (1 + γm)− log2 (1 + γEm)]+, (14)
respectively, where (x)+ = max {0, x}.
5It is worth noting that SOP is a well-known metric to evaluate secrecy
protocols. However, the practical suitability of this criterion is beyond of this
treatise.
1) The SOP of the n-th user: Based on the above defini-
tions, when the secrecy rate of the n-th user is less than the
target secrecy rate, the secrecy outage will occur. Hence the
SOP of the n-th user in external eavesdropping scenario can
be expressed as
Pn (Rn) =Pr (Cn < Rn)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγEn (x)Fγn
(
2Rn (1 + x)− 1) dx, (15)
where Rn denotes the n-th user’s target secrecy rate.
The follow-up focus is that the PDF fγEn of wiretap channel
should be formulated accurately. Furthermore, the following
lemma provides the PDF f ipSICCD,γEn of Eves with ipSIC for
CD-NOMA in detail.
Lemma 2. Assuming the Eves distributed uniformly within
the disc D2, the PDF f
ipSIC
CD,γEn
of the most pernicious Eve
with ipSIC for CD-NOMA is given by (16) at the top of
next page, where Φ= − 2πλe, ϕ1=ηρean, ϕ2=ρeΩIe , ζ =
(̟ϕ2)
j(K+j−1)!
ϕ
−K−j+i
1 (K−1)!
and ̟ 6= 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Similar to the solution process in (16), the PDF fpSICCD,γEn of
the most pernicious Eve with pSIC (̟ = 0) for CD-NOMA
can be given by (17) at the top of this page, where δ = 2
α
.
Upon substituting (9) and (16) into (15), the following
theorem provides the exact analysis of SOP for the n-th user
with ipSIC in CD-NOMA.
Theorem 1. Conditioned on the HPPPs, the SOP of the n-th
user with ipSIC for CD-NOMA is given by (18) at the top of
next page, where ϑ =
cu(2Rn (1+x)−1)
ηρan
.
As a further development, substituting (10) and (17) into
(15), the SOP of the n-th user with pSIC for CD-NOMA can
be given by (19) at the top of next page.
Corollary 1. For the special case with K = 1, the SOP
of the n-th user with ipSIC for PD-NOMA is given by (20),
where Θ = −δπλeϕ1Γ (δ) eϕ−12 and Γ (·, ·) denotes the upper
incomplete Gamma function.
Proof. See Appendix C.
On the basis of derived process in Appendix C, substituting
̟= 0 into (20), the SOP of the n-th user with pSIC for PD-
NOMA can be given by
P pSICPD,n (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
µbu
ηρean
∫ ∞
0
(
1
xδ
+
ηρeanδ
xδ+1
)
× e− µxδ e
−
x
ηρean − x
ηρean
(
1− e−ϑ) dx, (21)
where µ = δπλe(ηρean)
δ
Γ (δ).
6f ipSICCD,γEn (x) =e
Φ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
xiφζ
i!
∫
∞
0
[ϕ1+x̟ϕ2(1+r
α)]−K−j(1+rα)ie
−
x(1+rα)
ϕ1 rdr
Φ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
φζ
i!
e
− x
ϕ1
×
∫ ∞
0
{
ixi−1 − xi (1 + rα)ϕ−11
[ϕ1 + x̟ϕ2 (1 + rα)]
K+j
− ̟ϕ2 (1 + r
α) (K + j)xi
[ϕ1 + x̟ϕ2 (1 + rα)]
K+j+1
}
e
−xrα
ϕ1 (1 + rα)
i
rdr. (16)
fpSICCD,γEn (x) =e
−δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
1
i!ϕ
j−i+δ+1
1 Γ(j+δ)x
i−1−j−δe
−x
ϕ1
× δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
1
i!
ϕj−i+δ+11 Γ (j + δ)
[
(j − i+ 1 + δ)xi−j−δ−2 + x
i−j−1−δ
ϕ1
]
e
−x
ϕ1 . (17)
P ipSICCD,n (Rn) =
∫ ∞
0
e
Φ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
xiφζ
i!
∫
∞
0
[ϕ1+x̟ϕ2(1+r
α)]−K−j(1+rα)ie
−
x(1+rα)
ϕ1 rdr
Φ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
φζ
i!
e
− x
ϕ1
×
∫ ∞
0
{
ixi−1 − xi (1 + rα)ϕ−11
[ϕ1 + x̟ϕ2 (1 + rα)]
K+j
− ̟ϕ2 (1 + r
α) (K + j)xi
[ϕ1 + x̟ϕ2 (1 + rα)]
K+j+1
}
e
−xrα
ϕ1 (1 + rα)
i
rdr
×∆
U∑
u=1
bu

ΩKI Γ (K)− e−ϑ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
φψϑi
i!
[
ΩI
̟ρϑΩI + 1
]K+j
 dx. (18)
P pSICCD,n (Rn) =
∫ ∞
0
e
−δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
1
i!ϕ
j−i+δ+1
1 Γ(j+δ)x
i−1−j−δe
−x
ϕ1
δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
1
i!
ϕj−i+δ+11
× Γ (j + δ) e−xϕ1
[
(j − i+ 1 + δ)xi−j−δ−2 + x
i−j−1−δ
ϕ1
] U∑
u=1
bu
[
1− e−ϑ
K−1∑
i=0
ϑi
i!
]
dx. (19)
P ipSICPD,n (Rn) =Θ
∫ ∞
0
e
Θ(ϕ1+xϕ2)
δ−1
(xϕ2)
δ Γ
(
1−δ,ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
) U∑
u=1
bu
(
1− e
−ϑ
1 + ϑρΩI
){
Γ
(
1− δ, ϕ1 + xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
)
×
[
(δ − 1) (ϕ1 + xϕ2)δ−2
xδϕδ−12
− δ(ϕ1 + xρeΩIe)
δ−1
xδ+1ϕδ2
]
− ϕ
δ−1
1 e
−ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
xδ (ϕ1 + xϕ2)
}
dx. (20)
2) The SOP of the m-th user: When the secrecy rate of
the m-th user is less than target secrecy rate, secrecy outage
will be declared. As such, the SOP of the m-th user can be
expressed as
Pm (Rm) =Pr (Cm < Rm)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγEm (x)Fγm
(
2Rm (1 + x)− 1) dx, (22)
where Rm denotes the m-th user’s target secrecy rate.
The exact analysis of SOP for them-th user can be obtained
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Conditioned on the HPPPs, the SOP of the m-th
user for CD-NOMA is given by (23) at the next page, where
τ = 12Rm (1−am) − 1.
Proof. See Appendix D.
For the special case with K = 1, the SOP of the m-th user
for PD-NOMA is given by
PPDm (Rm) = κ
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ τ
0
e−
κ(am−anx)
δ
xδ
e
−
x
ηρe(am−anx)
× e− xηρe(am−anx)
[
anδ(am − anx)δ−1
xδ
+
δ(am − anx)δ
xδ+1
+
am(am − anx)δ−2
ηρexδ
]1− e− (2Rm (1+x)−1)cnηρ(am−(2Rm (1+x)−1)an)

 dx,
(24)
7PCDm (Rm) =
∫ τ
0
e
−δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
Γ(j+δ)
i! [
ηρe(am−anx)
x ]
j+δ−i
e
−x
ηρe(am−anx)
δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
Γ (j + δ)
i!
(ηρe)
j+δ−i
× e −xηρe(am−anx) (am − anx)j+δ−i
[
an (j − i+ δ)
xj−i+δ (am − anx) +
am
ηρexj−i+δ(am − anx)2
+
(j − i+ δ)
xj−i+δ+1
]
×
U∑
u=1
bu

1− e−
cu(2Rm (1+x)−1)
ηρ(am−(2Rm (1+x)−1)an)
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
[
cu
(
2Rm (1 + x)− 1)
ηρ (am − (2Rm (1 + x)− 1) an)
]i
 dx. (23)
where κ = δπλe(ηρe)
δ
Γ (δ).
Proposition 1. The SOP of user pairing, i.e., the n-th user
and m-th user with ipSIC/pSIC for CD/PD-NOMA are given
by
P ξCD,nm = 1−
(
1− P ξCD,n
)(
1− P ξCD,m
)
, (25)
and
P ξPD,nm = 1−
(
1− P ξPD,n
)(
1− P ξPD,m
)
, (26)
respectively, where ξ ∈ (ipSIC, pSIC). P ipSICCD,n , P pSICCD,n and
PCD,m can be obtained from (18), (19) and (23), respectively.
P ipSICPD,n , P
pSIC
PD,n and PPD,m can be obtained from (20), (21)
and (24), respectively.
B. Internal Eavesdropping Scenario
Assuming that them-th user is viewed as Eve to wiretap the
information of the n-th user. Hence the secrecy rate achieved
by internal eavesdropping scenario can be expressed as
Cm→n = [log2 (1 + γn)− log2 (1 + γEm→n)]+. (27)
By using the above the definitions, when the achievable
secrecy rate is inferior to the target secrecy rate, the SOP will
be happen. Hence the SOP of the m-th user to wiretap the
information of the n-th user can be given by
PCDm→n (Rm→n) = Pr (Cm→n < Rm→n)
=
∫ ∞
0
fγEm→n (x)Fγn
(
2Rm→n (1 + x)− 1) dx, (28)
where Rm→n denotes the target secrecy rate of the m-th user
to wiretap the n-th user.
Similar to solution process of (16) for external eavesdrop-
ping scenario, the exact analysis of PDF fCDγEm→n for CD-
NOMA in internal eavesdropping scenario can be given by
fCDγEm→n (x) = e
−Λ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
Γ(j+δ)
i! (
ηρean
x )
j+δ−i+1
e
−x
ηρean
× Λe −xηρean
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
1
i!
Γ (j + δ) (ηρean)
j−i+δ+1
×
[
(j + δ − i+ 1)xi−j−δ−2 + x
i−j−1−δ
ηρean
]
, (29)
where Λ = δπλe.
In internal eavesdropping scenario, the CDF of γn for the n-
th user in the main channel is not be affected effectively. As a
consequence, substituting (9) and (29) into (28), the following
theorem is capable of providing the exact expression of SOP
for the m-th user to wiretap the n-th user.
Theorem 3. Conditioned on the HPPPs, the SOP of the
m-th user to wiretap the n-th user with ipSIC for CD-
NOMA is given by (30) at the top of next page, where
ϑ1 =
cu(2Rm→n(1+x)−1)
ηρan
.
Upon substituting ̟ = 0 into (30) and after some manip-
ulations, the SOP of the m-th user to wiretap the n-th user
with pSIC for CD-NOMA is given by (31) at the top of next
page.
For the special case with K = 1, the SOP of the m-th user
to wiretap the n-th user with ipSIC for PD-NOMA is given
by
PPD,ipSICm→n (Rm→n) =
∫ ∞
0
µe−
µ
xδ
e
−
x
ηρan − x
ηρan
×
(
1
ηρanxδ
+
δ
xδ+1
) U∑
u=1
bu
[
1− e
−ϑ1
1 + ρϑ1ΩI
]
dx. (32)
Upon substituting ̟ = 0 into (32), the SOP of the m-th
user to wiretap the n-th user with pSIC for PD-NOMA is
given by
PPD,pSICm→n (Rm→n) =
∫ ∞
0
µe−µ
1
xδ
e
−
x
ηρean − x
ηρean
×
{
1
ηρeanxδ
+
δ
xδ+1
} U∑
u=1
bu
(
1− e−ϑ1). (33)
C. Secrecy Diversity Order Analysis
In order to obtain more insights, the secrecy diversity order
is selected to evaluate the secrecy performance of the unified
NOMA framework, which is capable of describing how fast
the SOP decreases with average SNR. Moreover, we proceed
to derive the asymptotic SOP in the high SNR region, when the
SNR of main channel between BS and LUs tends to infinity,
i.e., ρ → ∞. It is worth noting that ρ → ∞ corresponds to
the scenario where the LUs is closed to BS than Eves, which
is a practical scenario of interest. On the contrary, when the
average SNR approaches infinity at Eves, the Eves can always
wiretap information of LUs successfully. Hence the secrecy
diversity order can be written as follows:
d = − lim
ρ→∞
log (P∞ (ρ))
log ρ
, (34)
8PCD,ipSICm→n (Rm→n) = ∆Λ
∫ ∞
0
e
−Λ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
Γ(j+δ)
i! (
ηρean
x )
j+δ−i+1
e
−x
ηρean
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
Γ (j + δ)
i!
e
−x
ηρean (ηρean)
j+δ−i+1
×
[
(j + δ − i+ 1)xi−j−δ−2 + x
i−j−1−δ
ηρean
] U∑
u=1
bu

ΩKI Γ (K)− e−ϑ1
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
φψϑ1
i
i!
[
1
̟ρϑ1ΩI + 1
]K+j
 dx. (30)
PCD,pSICm→n (Rm→n) =Λ
∫ ∞
0
e
−Λ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
Γ(j+δ)
i! (
ηρean
x )
j+δ−i+1
e
−x
ηρean
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
Γ (j + δ)
i!
e
−x
ηρean
× (ηρean)j+δ−i+1
[
(j + δ − i+ 1)xi−j−δ−2 + x
i−j−1−δ
ηρean
] U∑
u=1
bu
[
1− e−ϑ1
K−1∑
i=0
ϑi1
i!
]
dx. (31)
where P∞ (ρ) denotes the asymptotic SOP in the high SNR
region.
1) External Eavesdropping Scenario: In light of the above
explanations, when ρ→∞, we provide the approximate SOP
of LUs for CD/PD-NOMA as follows.
Corollary 2. The asymptotic SOP of the n-th user with ipSIC
at high SNR region for CD-NOMA is given by
P ipSICCD,n,∞ (Rn) = ∆
∫ ∞
0
f ipSICCD,γEn (x)
U∑
u=1
bu
{
ΩKI Γ (K)
−
K−1∑
i=0
(̟ρϑ)
i
i!
(
ΩI
̟ρϑΩI + 1
)K+i
Γ (K + i)
}
dx, (35)
where ̟ 6= 0 and f ipSICCD,γEn can be obtained from (16).
Proof. We show concern for diversity order analysis by char-
acterizing the CDF of the LUs. When ρ→∞, based on (A.2)
and through some manuscripts, we can obtain the asymptotic
unordered CDF of F ipSICCD,γn as follows:
F ipSIC,∞CD,γn (x) = ∆
U∑
u=1
bu
[
ΩKI Γ (K)−
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
×
(
x̟cu
ηan
)i(
ηanΩI
x̟cuΩI + ηan
)K+i
Γ (K + i)
]
. (36)
Then based on (15), we can replace the CDF of F ipSICCD,γn by
the asymptotic CDF F ipSIC,∞CD,γn and arrive at the asymptotic
SOP of the n-th user with ipSIC for CD-NOMA. The proof
is completed.
Remark 1. Up on substituting (35) into (34), we observe that
the secrecy diversity order of the n-th user with ipSIC for CD-
NOMA is equal to zero. This is due to the fact that there is
the effect of residual interference from ipSIC.
On the basis of the approximate result in [27, Eq. (29)] and
removing the ordering operation, the asymptotic SOP of the
n-th user with pSIC for CD-NOMA at high SNR region is
given by
P pSICCD,n,∞ (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
bu
K!
∫ ∞
0
fpSICCD,γEn (x)ϑ
Kdx, (37)
where fpSICCD,γEn can be obtained from (17).
Remark 2. Up on substituting (37) into (34), the secrecy
diversity order of the n-th user with pSIC for CD-NOMA is
equal to the number of subcarriers K . It is shown that CD-
NOMA is capable of achieving more secrecy diversity gain
compared to PD-NOMA.
Similar to (35) and (37), the asymptotic SOP of the n-th
user with ipSIC/pSIC at high SNR region for PD-NOMA are
given by
P ipSICPD,n,∞ (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ ∞
0
f ipSICPD,En (x)
(
ϑρΩI
1 + ϑρΩI
)
dx,
(38)
and
P pSICPD,n,∞ (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ ∞
0
fpSICPD,En (x) ϑdx, (39)
respectively, where f ipSICPD,En (x) = Θe
ΘG(ϕ1+xϕ2)
δ−1
(xϕ2)
δ
×
(
QG− ϕδ−11 e
−
ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
xδ(ϕ1+xϕ2)
)
, Q = (δ−1)(ϕ1+xϕ2)
δ−2
xδϕδ−12
−
δ(ϕ1+xρeΩIe )
δ−1
xδ+1ϕδ2
, G = Γ
(
1− δ, ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
)
. fpSICPD,γEn (x) =
µΓ (δ) e−µΓ(δ)
1
xδ
e
−
x
ηρean
(
1
ηρeanxδ
+ δ
xδ+1
)
e−
x
ηρean .
Remark 3. Up on substituting (38) and (39) into (34), the
secrecy diversity orders of the n-th user with ipSIC/pSIC for
PD-NOMA are equal to zero and one, respectively.
Following the procedures similar to the approximate results
in [27, Eq. (26) and Eq. (27)] and removing the ordering
9operation, the asymptotic SOP of the m-th user for CD/PD-
NOMA at high SNR region are given by
PCDm,∞ (Rm) = Ξ
U∑
u=1
bu
K!
∫ τ
0
e
−Ξ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
ς
i!xi−j−δ
×
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
ς
i!
[
an (j − i+ δ)
xj−i+δ (am − anx) +
(j − i+ δ)
xj−i+δ+1
+
am
ηρexj−i+δ(am − anx)2
](
xcu
ηρ (am − xan)
)K
dx, (40)
and
PPDm,∞ (Rm) = κ
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ τ
0
e−
κ(am−anx)
δ
xδ
e
−
x
ηρe(am−anx)
× e− xηρe(am−anx)
[
anδ(am − anx)δ−1
xδ
+
δ(am − anx)δ
xδ+1
+
am(am − anx)δ−2
ηρexδ
]
xcn
ηρ (am − xan)dx, (41)
respectively, where am > xan, Ξ = δπλe and ς =
e
−x
ηρe(am−anx)Γ (j + δ) [ηρe (am − anx)]j+δ−i.
Remark 4. Up on substituting (40) and (41) into (34), the
secrecy diversity orders of the m-th user with for CD/PD-
NOMA are equal to one and K , respectively.
Proposition 2. The asymptotic SOP of user pairing with
ipSIC/pSIC for CD/PD-NOMA are given by
PCD,ξnm,∞ = 1−
(
1− P ξCD,n,∞
) (
1− PCDm,∞
)
, (42)
and
PPD,ξnm,∞ = 1−
(
1− P ξPD,n,∞
) (
1− PPDm,∞
)
, (43)
respectively. P ipSICCD,n,∞, P
pSIC
CD,n,∞ and P
CD
m,∞ (Rm) can be
obtained from (35) and (37) and (40), respectively. P ipSICPD,n,∞
and P pSICPD,n,∞ can be obtained from (38) and (39) and (41),
respectively.
Remark 5. Upon substituting (42) and (43) into (34), the
secrecy diversity orders of user pairing with ipSIC/pSIC for
CD-NOMA and PD-NOMA are zero/K and zero/one, respec-
tively.
2) Internal Eavesdropping Scenario: In this case, the CDF
of γn for the n-th user in main channel is invariant. As a
further development, the asymptotic SOP of the m-th user to
wiretap the n-th user with ipSIC/pSIC for CD-NOMA at high
SNR region can be given by
P ipSIC,∞CD,m→n (Rn) = ∆
∫ ∞
0
fCDγEm→n (x)
U∑
u=1
bu
{
ΩKI Γ (K)
−
K−1∑
i=0
(̟ρϑ1)
i
i!
(
ΩI
̟ρϑ1ΩI + 1
)K+i
Γ (K + i)
}
dx, (44)
TABLE I: Table of Parameters for Numerical Results
Monte Carlo simulations repeated 105 iterations
Carrier frequency 1 GHz
The radius of a disc region for Eves 1000 m
Path loss exponent α = 2
Power allocation coefficients of NOMA am = 0.8, an = 0.2
Targeted data rates
Rn = Rm = 0.01 BPCU
Rm→n = 0.01 BPCU
The radius of the n-th LU zone RD1 = 2 m
The radius of the m-th LU zone RD2 = 10 m
and
P pSIC,∞CD,m→n (Rn) = ∆
U∑
u=1
bu
K!
∫ ∞
0
ϑK1 f
CD
γEm→n
(x)dx, (45)
where fCDγEm→n can be obtained from (29).
Remark 6. Up on substituting (44) and (45) into (34), the
secrecy diversity orders of the m-th user to wiretap the n-th
user with ipSIC/pSIC for CD-NOMA are equal to zero and K ,
respectively.
The asymptotic SOP of the m-th to wiretap the n-th user
with ipSIC/pSIC for PD-NOMA at high SNR region can be
given by
P ipSIC,∞PD,m→n (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ ∞
0
µe−
µ
xδ
e
−
x
ηρean − x
ηρean
×
(
1
ηρeanxδ
+
δ
xδ+1
)(
ϑ1ρΩI
1 + ϑ1ρΩI
)
dx, (46)
and
P pSIC,∞PD,m→n (Rn) =
U∑
u=1
bu
∫ ∞
0
µϑ1e
− µ
xδ
e
−
x
ηρean − x
ηρean
×
(
1
ηρeanxδ
+
δ
xδ+1
)
dx, (47)
respectively.
Remark 7. Up on substituting (46) and (47) into (34), the
secrecy diversity orders of the m-th user to wiretap the n-th
user with ipSIC/pSIC for PD-NOMA are equal to zero and
one, respectively.
From the above remarks, we observe that the secrecy
diversity orders of LUs are not only related to the number of
subcarriers K , but also affected by the residual interference
from SIC. Hence it is important to consider the size of
subcarriers K and residual interference in realistic secure
communication scenarios.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results of the secrecy transmission
for the unified NOMA framework are present to verify the
accuracy of the analytical expressions, where both external
and internal eavesdropping scenarios are discussed in detail.
We show interplay of different system configuration param-
eters and impacts on the SOP for CD/PD-NOMA networks.
Monte Carlo simulation parameters used in this section are
10
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Fig. 2: The SOP versus the transmit SNR, with ρe = 10 dB,
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−3, K = 2, α = 2 and Rn = Rm = 0.01 BPCU.
summarized in Table I, where BPCU is abbreviation of bit
per channel use. Simulation results are denoted by • and
the complexity-vs-accuracy tradeoff parameter is set to be
U = 15. In external eavesdropping scenario, the conventional
OMA scheme is selected to be a benchmark for comparing the
secrecy performance of unified NOMA framework, while the
security performance of PD-NOMA is viewed as baseline for
the purpose of comparison in internal eavesdropping scenario.
A. External Eavesdropping Scenario
In this subsection, the secrecy performance of CD/PD-
NOMA networks is characterized in terms of SOP for external
internal eavesdropping scenario.
Fig. 2 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR with different
residual interference values, where K = 2, α = 2 and Rn
= Rm = 0.01 BPCU. The exact analytical curves of SOP
for the n-th user with ipSIC and pSIC are plotted based
on (18) and (19), respectively. The exact theoretical curve
of SOP for the m-th user is plotted based on (23). It can
be seen that the numerical evaluation curves match with
analytical results. The exact asymptotic curves of SOP for
the n-th user with ipSIC and pSIC are plotted based on (35)
and (37), respectively. The exact asymptotic curve of SOP
for the m-th user is plotted based on (40). Moreover, the
approximate analysis results of SOP perfectly match with
the theoretical analysis in the high SNR region. One can
observed that the secrecy outage behavior of the n-th user
with pSIC is superior to that of the OMA scheme, while the
security performance of the m-th user is inferior to OMA.
This comes from the fact that NOMA scheme is capable of
providing more user fairness in comparison to OMA [11, 16,
17]. Another significant observation is that SOP of the n-
th user with ipSIC converge to an error floor and thus gain
a zero secrecy diversity order. The reason is that the ipSIC
scheme employed at n-th user for the main channel brings the
effect of residual interference on outage probability, which
verifies the conclusion in Remark 1. In the case of fixed
the residual interference level, i.e., ̟ = 1, as the residual
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interference value from −30 dB to −20 dB increases, the
outage performance of the n-th user with ipSIC is becoming
more worse. That is to say that the corresponding error floors
for SOP are becoming more larger. Furthermore, the different
impact levels of residual interference also degrade the secrecy
performance seriously. More specifically, under the condition
of E {‖hI‖22} = E
{‖hIe‖22} = −30 dB, with the value of ̟
increasing from ̟ = 0.3 to ̟ = 1, the superiority of outage
behaviors for the n-th user with ipSIC is no longer obvious.
These imply how to eliminate the residual interference should
be taken into account in practical secrecy NOMA scenarios.
Fig. 3 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR with different
subcarriers K , ρe = 10 dB, λe = 10
−3, α = 2, ̟= 1 and Rn
= Rm = 0.01 BPCU. As can be seen from this figure, with the
number of subcarriers increasing, the slopes of SOP for CD-
NOMA (K = 3) are larger than that of PD-NOMA (K = 1).
This can be explained by the fact that the secrecy CD-NOMA
network provides a diversity gain that is equal to the number
of subcarriers K , which is also validated by the insights in
Remark 3 and Remark 4. This implies that by spreading the
user’s information into a plurality of subcarriers, CD-NOMA
has enhanced the secrecy performance of users achieved and
provided spread spectrum gain with respect to PD-NOMA.
Fig. 4 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR with different
target secrecy rates, where ρe = 10 dB, λe = 10
−3, K = 2,
α = 2 and ̟= 1. One can show that the selection of target
secrecy rate has a greater impact on the SOP for NOMA
networks. With increasing of the target secrecy rates, the
outage probability of users for secrecy NOMA are becoming
worse seriously. It is worth pointing out that the adaptive
secrecy target rates has a large effect on the performance
of secure communication for CD/PD-NOMA networks. As
a consequence, the requirements of smaller secrecy rate can
be applied into small packet business and internet of things
scenarios.
Fig. 5 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR with dif-
ferent path loss exponents α = 2, 3, 4, where ρe = 10 dB,
λe = 10
−3, K = 2 and ̟= 1. It can be seen from this figure
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that by increasing the path loss exponent, i.e., more severe
path loss, leads to a poorer secrecy outage behaviors. It is
worth mentioning that the effect of path loss on the secrecy
performance of the n-th user is smaller, while has a greater
impact on the m-th user. The main reason for this result is that
the m-th user is far away from BS and is greatly affected by
large-scale fading. Furthermore, the SOP versus the transmit
SNR with different radius distance is plotted in Fig. 6. One can
observe that the better SOP can be achieved by reducing the
radius of the user distance, since the smaller radius distance
results in a lower path loss.
Fig. 7 plots the SOP of a pair of NOMA users (the n-th user
and the m-th user) versus the transmit SNR, where ρe = 10
dB, λe = 10
−3, K = 2 and ̟= 1. The exact analytical curves
of SOP for CD/PD-NOMA networks are plotted based on (25)
and (26), respectively. It can be seen that simulation results
well match the theoretical results perfectly. The asymptotic
curves of SOP for CD/PD-NOMA networks are plotted based
on (42) and (43), respectively. The approximate results con-
verge to exact analytical results at high SNR. One can observe
that the secrecy performance of CD-NOMA is superior to that
of PD-NOMA, since CD-NOMA is capable of providing a
larger secrecy diversity order. This phenomenon also verify
the conclusion in Remark 5. Another observation is that in
the absence of channel ordering between BS and users, the
secrecy performance of CD/PD-NOMA is not depend on that
of the distant user.
To observe how the power allocation factor affects the
secrecy outage performance in the unified NOMA framework,
we present the curves of SOP versus dynamic power factor
θ in Fig. 8, where an = θ and am = 1 − θ. As can
observed from the figure, with the increase of SNR, the
SOP of user pairing is gradually reduced on the condition
of pSIC, while the SOP of user pairing with ipSIC converges
to a constant value. This phenomenon can be explained as
that the imperfect cancellation scheme employed brings more
residual interference. Fixing the SNR, i.e., ρ = 40 dB, when
θ decreases, the SOP of user pairing with pSIC is becoming
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Fig. 9: The SOP versus the transmit SNR, with ρe = 10 dB,
λe = 10
−3, K = 2 and RD1 = 2 m.
smaller; On the contrary, the change degrades the secrecy
performance with ipSIC. This is due to the fact that the
signal power of the nearby user mainly affect the secure
performance. As a consequence, the adaptive power allocation
factors between NOMA users are important for achieving the
optimal security performance.
B. Internal Eavesdropping Scenario
In this subsection, the secrecy outage behaviors of the m-th
user to wiretap the n-th user are evaluated for CD/PD-NOMA.
Fig. 9 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR, where
ρe = 10 dB, λe = 10
−3, K = 2 and RD1 = 2 m. Under the
condition of ipSIC/pSIC, the exact SOP curves of the m-th
user to wiretap the n-th user for CD-NOMA and PD-NOMA
are plotted based on (30), (31) and (32), (33), respectively.
The analytical results are consistent with simulation results,
which further confirm the accuracy of derived results. As can
be observed from this figure that the secrecy outage behaviors
of the m-th user to wiretap the n-th user for CD-NOMA
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λe = 10
−3, K = 2 and ̟= 1.
outperform that of the m-th user to wiretap the n-th user
for PD-NOMA. This is because that CD-NOMA is capable
of obtaining more diversity gain. Another observation is that
the residual interference levels of ipSIC have a greater impact
on secrecy behaviors. As ̟ becomes small from ̟= 1 to
̟= 0.5, the performance gain brought by ipSIC is becoming
more obvious. Additionally, increasing the value of residual
interference with the fixed interference level, i.e., ̟= 1,
the secrecy behaviors of internal eavesdropping scenario are
becoming worse. Hence it is important to premeditate the
influence of residual interference when performing physical
layer secure communication.
Fig. 10 plots the SOP versus the transmit SNR with different
distances, where ρe = 10 dB, λe = 10
−3, K = 2, ̟= 1 and
E{‖hI‖22} = −30 dB. It can be obviously seen from the figure
that the theoretical and simulation results are closely matched
for different parameters. As can be observed from figure that
increasing the distance between BS and users will reduce the
SOP, which can be explained as the secrecy behaviors of the
m-th user to wiretap the n-th user are progressively affected
by the large scale fading.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the physical layer security issues are discussed
exhaustively in a unified NOMA framework, where both
external and internal eavesdropping scenarios are taken into
account. The spatial locations of LUs and Eves are modeled
by applying statistic geometry. The secrecy behavior of a
unified NOMA framework has been investigated insightfully.
New exact and asymptotic expressions of SOP for CD/PD-
NOMA with ipSIC/pSIC have been derived to characterize
the secrecy performance. One can observe that the secrecy
diversity orders of the m-th user for CD/PD-NOMA are K
and one, respectively. Due to the effect of residual interference,
a zero secrecy diversity order has been obtained by the n-th
user with ipSIC for both eavesdropping scenarios in CD/PD-
NOMA networks. Based on analytical results, it was shown
that the secrecy diversity orders of LUs with pSIC for CD-
13
NOMA are depended on the number of subcarries considered
in the networks. Finally, numerical simulations were presented
to verify the accuracy of analytical results.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof starts by assuming GK×M belongs to regular
sparse matrix with gn and gm having the same column
weights. Based on (3), the CDF F ipSICCD,γn of γn for CD-NOMA
can be expressed as
F ipSICCD,γn (x) = Pr
(
ρ ‖diag (hn)gn‖22 an
̟ρ ‖hI‖22 + 1
< x
)
, (A.1)
where ̟ 6= 0. By the virtue of [27, Eq. (8)] and removing
ordering operation, the equation (A.1) can be further calculated
as follows:
F ipSICCD,γn (x) ≈ ∆
∫ ∞
0
yK−1e−
y
ΩI
{
U∑
u=1
bu [1
−e−xcu(̟ρy+1)ηρan
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
xcu (̟ρy + 1)
ηρan
)i]}
dy (A.2)
= ∆
U∑
u=1
bu


∫ ∞
0
yK−1e−
y
ΩI dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
− e− xcuηρan
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
xcu
ηρan
)i
×
∫ ∞
0
yK−1e−
y(x̟cuΩI+ηan)
ηanΩI (̟ρy + 1)
i
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
, (A.3)
where ∆ = 1
(K−1)!ΩK
I
.
By the virtue of [44, Eq. (3.381.4)] and using Binomial
theorem, J1 and J2 are given by
J1 = Ω
K
I Γ (K) , (A.4)
and
J2 =e
− xcu
ηρan
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
1
i!
(
i
j
)(
xcu
ηρan
)i
×
(
ηanΩI
x̟cuΩI + ηan
)K+j
(̟ρ)
j
Γ (K + j) , (A.5)
respectively.
Upon substituting (A.4) and (A.5) into (A.3), we can obtain
(9) and complete the proof.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
To derive the PDF f ipSICCD,γEn of the most pernicious
Eve, we should first calculate the corresponding CDF
F ipSICCD,γEn previously. For notational simplicity, define X
∆
=
‖diag (he)ge‖22 = ηY1+dαe , Y =
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣gekh˜ek∣∣∣2 and Z ∆=
‖hIe‖22. It may be readily observe that Y and Z obeys
a Gamma distribution with the parameters of (K, 1) and
(K,ΩIe), respectively. Hence the CDF and PDF of Y and
Z are given by FY (y)=1 − e−y
K−1∑
i=0
yi
i! and fZ (z) =
yK−1e
−
z
ΩIe
ΩK
Ie
(K−1) , respectively.
Based on (6), the CDF F ipSICCD,γEn of γEn for CD-NOMA
can be expressed as
F ipSICCD,γEn (x) = Pr
[
max
e∈Φe
(
ρe ‖diag (he)ge‖22 an
̟ρe ‖hIe‖22 + 1
)
< x
]
= EΦe
{∏
e∈Φe
∫ ∞
0
fZ (z)FY
[
x (̟ρez + 1) (1 + d
α
e )
ϕ1
]
dz
}
,
(B.1)
where ̟ 6= 0.
By applying the generating function [39] and polar coor-
dinate conversion, the equation (B.1) can be calculated as
follows:
F ipSICCD,γEn (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
fZ (z)
× FY
(
x (̟ρez + 1) (1 + r
α)
ϕ1
)
dz
]
rdr
}
= exp

Φ
∫ ∞
0
e−
x(1+rα)
ϕ1
(K − 1)!ΩKIe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
(̟ρe)
j
i!
(
x
ϕ1
)i
×(1 + rα)ir
∫ ∞
0
zK+j−1e
−
z[ϕ1+x̟(1+rα)ρeΩIe ]
ϕ1ΩIe dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
dr

 ,
(B.2)
where ϕ1=ηρean and Φ=− 2πλe.
By the virtue of [44, Eq. (3.351.3)], J3 is given by
J3 = (K + j − 1)!
(
ϕ1 + x̟ (1 + r
α) ρeΩIe
ϕ1ΩIe
)−K−j
,
(B.3)
Upon substituting (B.3) into (B.2), the CDF F ipSICCD,γEn is
given by
F ipSICCD,γEn (x) = exp

Φ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
xiφζ
i!
∫ ∞
0
(1 + rα)
i
× [ϕ1 + x̟ϕ2 (1 + rα)]−K−je−
x(1+rα)
ϕ1 rdr
}
, (B.4)
where ϕ2=ρeΩIe , φ =
i!
(i−j)!j! and ζ =
(̟ϕ2)
j(K+j−1)!
ϕ
−K−j+i
1 (K−1)!
.
After that, applying the derivative of F ipSICCD,γEn and some
manipulations, the PDF f ipSICCD,γEn can be obtain in (16) and
the proof is completed.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Denoting X˜
∆
=
∣∣∣h˜ek∣∣∣2 = ηY˜1+dαe , Y˜ = |hek|2 and Z˜ =
|hIek|2, we can observe that the CDF and PDF of Y˜ and
Z˜ are equal to FY˜ (y)=1 − e−y and fZ˜ (z) = 1ΩIe e
− zΩIe ,
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respectively. Based on (6), the CDF F ipSICPD,En (x) of γEn for
PD-NOMA with K = 1 can be expressed as
F ipSICPD,En (x) = Pr

max
e∈Φe

 ρe
∣∣∣h˜ek∣∣∣2an
̟ρe|hIek|2 + 1

 < x


= EΦe
{∏
e∈Φe
∫ ∞
0
fZ˜ (z)FY˜
(
x (ρez + 1) (1 + d
α
e )
ϕ1
)
dy
}
,
(C.1)
where ̟ 6= 0.
Applying the generating function, we can re-write (C.1) as
F ipSICPD,En (x) = exp
{
−2πλe
∫ ∞
0
[
1−
∫ ∞
0
fZ˜ (z)
× FY˜
(
x (ρez + 1) (1 + r
α)
ϕ1
)
dy
]
rdr
}
= exp

−2πλeϕ1
∫ ∞
0
re
− x(1+r
α)
ϕ1
ϕ1 + xρeΩIe + xρeΩIer
α
dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
J4

 .
(C.2)
By invoking [44, Eq. (3.383.10)], we can obtain
J4 =Γ (δ) e
1
ρeΩIe
(ϕ1 + xρeΩIe)
δ−1
α(xρeΩIe)
δ
× Γ
(
1− δ, ϕ1 + xρeΩIe
ρeΩIeϕ1
)
. (C.3)
Upon substituting (C.3) into (C.2), the CDF of F ipSICPD,En (x)
can be given by
F ipSICPD,En (x) = exp
{
−δπλeϕ1Γ (δ) e
1
ρeΩIe
× (ϕ1 + xρeΩIe)
δ−1
(xρeΩIe)
δ
Γ
(
1− δ, ϕ1 + xρeΩIe
ρeΩIeϕ1
)}
, (C.4)
where δ = 2
α
.
With the help of derivation formula, i.e., Γ (s, x)|′x =
−xs−1e−x and deriving the above formula, the PDF of
f ipSICPD,En (x) can be obtain
f ipSICPD,En (x) = e
Θ
(ϕ1+xϕ2)
δ−1
(xϕ2)
δ Γ
(
1−δ,ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
)
Θ
×
{[
(δ − 1) (ϕ1 + xϕ2)δ−2
xδϕδ−12
− δ(ϕ1 + xρeΩIe)
δ−1
xδ+1ϕδ2
]
×Γ
(
1− δ, ϕ1 + xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
)
− ϕ
δ−1
1 e
−ϕ1+xϕ2
ϕ1ϕ2
xδ (ϕ1 + xϕ2)
}
, (C.5)
where Θ = −δπλeϕ1Γ (δ) eϕ−12 .
Upon substituting (C.5) and (11) into (15), we can obtain
(20) and complete the proof.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof starts by solving the CDF FCDEm (x) of γEm for
CD-NOMA. Based on (7), we can formulate
FCDEm (x) = Pr
[
max
e∈Φe
(
ρeam ‖diag (he)ge‖22
ρean ‖diag (he) ge‖22 + 1
)
< x
]
= E
{∏
e∈Φe
FY
[
(1 + dαe )x
ηρe (am − anx)
]}
, (D.1)
where am > xan and the CDF of FY (y) can be obtain from
Appendix B.
Following a procedure similar to that used for obtaining
(B.2), we employ the generating function and turn to polar
coordinates. Then (D.1) can be further expressed as
FCDEm (x) = exp
{
−2πλee
−x
ηρe(am−anx)
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
×
[
x
ηρe (am − anx)
]i ∫ ∞
0
(1 + rα)ie
−xrα
ηρe(am−anx) rdr
}
.
(D.2)
Applying Binomial theorem and [44, Eq. (3.326.2)], we arrive
at
FCDEm (x) = exp

−δπλe
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
1
i!
×Γ (j + δ)
[
ηρe (am − anx)
x
]j−i+δ
e
−x
ηρe(am−anx)
}
. (D.3)
Upon setting the derivation of the CDF in (D.4), we can obtain
the PDF of
fCDEm (x) = e
−Υ
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(ij)
Γ(j+δ)
i! [
ηρe(am−anx)
x ]
j+δ−i
Υ
×
K−1∑
i=0
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
Γ (j + δ) (ηρe)
j+δ−i
i!
[
an (j + δ − i)
xj+δ−i (am − anx)
+
am
ηρexj+δ−i(am − anx)2
+
(j + δ − i)
xj+δ−i+1
]
(am − anx)j+δ−i,
(D.4)
where Υ = δπλee
−x
ηρe(am−anx) .
By the virtue of [27, Eq. (7)] and removing the ordering
operation, the CDF FCDγm of the m-th user for CD-NOMA
can be given by
FCDγm (x) ≈
U∑
u=1
bu
[
1− e− xcuηρ(am−xan)
×
K−1∑
i=0
1
i!
(
xcu
ηρ (am − xan)
)i]
, (D.5)
where am > xan.
Substituting (D.4) and (D.5) into (22), we can obtain (23)
and complete the proof.
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